
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Sizing It Up:
Labor Migration Lessons of the EU Enlargement to 27
IZA DP No. 6119
November 2011
Amelie F. Constant 
Sizing It Up: 
Labor Migration Lessons of the 




Amelie F. Constant 














P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 








Sizing It Up: 
Labor Migration Lessons of the EU Enlargement to 27 
 
While economists were pointing out the advantages of the EU enlargement, politicians and 
policymakers were raising grave concerns about the significant political and economic 
differences between the newcomer states (EU12) and the “old Europe” of EU15. The major 
point of apprehension was related to the labor markets. Visceral fear rendered more than one 
in two Europeans to believe that the EU enlargement contributed to job losses in their own 
country. Some EU15 member states opted for transitional arrangements and did not allow 
labor mobility from the EU12. This chapter reviews the achievements of the first five years of 
the EU27 and assesses and evaluates the effectiveness of the enforced policies while it 
identifies winner and losers. Overall, the EU enlargement did not produce any negative 
effects or disruptions in the labor markets of the Member States. All three agents, the 
migrants, the receiving countries, and the sending countries gained from labor mobility. The 
EU15 countries with closed door policy lost in high-skilled labor and their labor markets 
experienced a delayed adjustment that overlapped with the global crisis and exacerbated 
negativity. As self-employed labor was not under the same mobility Act, the self-employed 
were able to move to the country they were needed and open successful businesses. The 
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On May 1, 2009, the European Union (EU)
1 celebrated the fifth anniversary of its historic enlargement. 
In May 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia joined the 15 other countries already in the EU; Bulgaria and Romania joined in 
January 2007. It was an amazing moment for the visionaries who had been pushing for a united Europe 
with free mobility of goods, services and labor.  
Economists know well that eliminating barriers to trade, to capital flows and to migration brings about 
tremendous gains. The geographic mobility of workers, in particular, can act as the equilibrating factor 
between demand and supply in labor markets, while it also contributes to better skill matches; positive 
externalities usually outweigh the negative ones. Calculated at the 2005 wage and productivity gap 
between Western and Eastern Europe, Boeri and Bruecker (2005) showed that a 3% Eastern migration 
to the West could increase total EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by up to 0.5%. D’Auria et al. 
(2008) found that following the 2004 EU enlargement GDP increased and there was a small positive 
effect on employment, albeit GDP per capita decreased. Retrospectively, the European Commission 
(2009) asserted that between 2004 and 2007 there were 12.2 million jobs created in the EU27, and that 
in 2007 the employment rate reached 65.4%. Looking at existing estimates, Clemens (2011) suggested 
that even small reductions in the barriers to labor mobility could bring enormous gains, often in the 
range between 50% and150% of world GDP.  
Yet, politicians and policymakers in the EU15 raised grave concerns about the significant political and 
economic differences between the newcomer states (EU12) and the “old Europe” of EU15. Additional 
confusion in the media portrayed enlargement as encroachment and unfair competition with economic, 
social, cultural and political consequences. As labor mobility became the one and only focal point, a 
large number of EU15 citizens expressed fear and suspicion in anticipation of a future inundation by 
the EU10 citizens. Subsequently, some EU15 countries refused free labor mobility to the newcomers. 
                                                            
1 EU indicates the EU of all 27 member states (EU27). EU15 or Old Member States (OMS) are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. EU10 refers to member states that joined EU on May 1, 2004. They were Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. EU8 refers to EU10 member states 
but without Cyprus and Malta. EU12 or New Member States (NMS) refers to EU10 plus Bulgaria and Romania that joined 
the EU on January 1, 2007. EU25 refers to the 25 member states that were united before January 1, 2007. 3 
 
Germany and Austria, for example, fearing that thousands of Eastern Europeans would inundate their 
labor markets consequently creating unemployment and lower wages for natives, imposed a stringent 
transition period of a maximum of seven years. Similarly, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and Spain kept 
their doors closed for the EU2 until January 2009.  
It important to note here that we refer to free mobility of salaried workers (as it is provided in Article 
39). The EU law, explicitly distinguishes salaried workers from the self-employed, who are protected 
under Article 43. Accordingly, the transitional arrangements can only apply to salaried workers. EU 
workers and their families are protected under the EU law against discrimination due to their 
nationality vis-à-vis employment, public housing, tax advantages and social advantages. Lastly, a 
Member State should always give preference to workers from the NMS than workers from non-EU 
countries (European Commission, 2009). 
As it is always true in economics, whenever a shock occurs (either because of an unexpected act, a 
natural experiment or a government intervention), it creates a group of gainers and a group of losers. 
The economist's task is then to identify these groups, and evaluate the gains and losses at the aggregate 
level. A possible outcome is a Pareto improvement, that is, given an initial distribution of goods among 
individuals, moving to a different distribution that makes at least one individual better off without 
making any other individual worse off is called a Pareto improvement.
2  
The purpose of this chapter is to take stock of the EU27 current state of affairs, to assess the impact of 
the 2004 historic natural experiment on free mobility, and to examine and judge the effectiveness of the 
enacted policies and their ramifications on the sending and the receiving countries. Special emphasis 
will be paid on the functioning of the labor markets, human capital and the movement of people. Our 
evaluation and drawing of lessons from this experiment would be tainted if we would not account for 
the 2008 global economic and financial crises that affected almost all EU27 members one way or 
another. The impact of the economic crisis on migration flows in Europe and implications for public 
policy in the enlarged EU of 27 will be discussed.   
 
                                                            
2 This notion is about improving efficiency and does not imply anything about equity and ethics. 4 
 
II. European Labor Markets, Human Capital Immobility, and the Digital Age  
Right at the beginning of the 21st century, in March 2000, the European Council set up the "Lisbon 
Agenda" or "Lisbon Strategy." The Lisbon Agenda was meant to be the new directive for the decade 
that could address globalization challenges, combat social exclusion, render the EU the most dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world with full employment for all, while ensuring that economic 
growth be decoupled. In 2001, the Stockholm European Council set intermediate targets for 
deliverables and required a mid-term review in 2005. Accordingly, all member states should adopt 
national reform programs with priority on lasting economic growth and the creation of more and better 
jobs; many member states started implementing Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP). The Stockholm 
Council also endorsed concrete objectives about education and training. Facilitating universal access to 
education, and opening up education and training systems to the wider world were top priorities. The 
Copenhagen Declaration in November 2002 explicitly stated that "strategies for lifelong learning and 
mobility are essential to promote employability, active citizenship, social inclusion and personal 
development." The aim was to increase voluntary cooperation in vocational education and training, 
while promoting mutual trust, transparency and recognition of competences and qualifications. 
While the free mobility of people in a united Europe is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the 
EU, there has been virtually no labor mobility among member states. Oddly enough, the more people 
are free to move and work within the EU, the less they actually move. The percent of EU15 nationals in 
other EU15 states has been low and stable over time. On average, between 2000 and 2005, workers’ 
mobility within EU15 amounted to only 1% each year (Bonin et al., 2008). This Eurosklerosis 
phenomenon is difficult to be explained by economic theory, which posits that labor mobility 
contributes to an optimal allocation of economic resources, generates higher output by reaching a 
higher Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF), increases wellbeing, and ensures a quick adjustment of 
labor market inefficiencies. The exception to the European labor immobility was the Scandinavian 
countries that instituted "flexicurity," a policy model combining labor market flexibility and security 
for workers of being in employment, along with ALMP. 
Traditionally, the majority of foreign residents in the EU15 have been nationals from non-EU countries. 
In the new EU27, the treaties stated that an EU member state must prefer workers from the New 
Member States (NMS) over workers from non-EU countries. However, after the NMS joined EU to 5 
 
form the EU27 the majority of immigrants were still from non-EU countries; the share of EU12 
migrants in the EU15 was relatively low. The average mobility rate from the NMS to the EU15 
countries was about 0.2% (Bonin et al., 2008). Moreover, the share of non-EU27 nationals in the EU15 
increased, especially in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK).  
Reasons explaining the low labor mobility within the EU are: the accelerating ageing of the work 
population, the rise of female employment in dual income households, the continuous rise in home-
ownership, lack of innovation dynamics, decline in the number of available new jobs and the changing 
of traditional jobs to digital ones. Institutional barriers such as administrative delay and variation in the 
level of payments of social security benefits, limited transferability of (supplementary) pensions, legal 
and administrative problems concerning the different taxation systems, differences in health care 
systems, and limited portability and recognition of education degrees and qualifications are often cited 
as important hurdles to labor mobility within the EU15. Lastly, language and cultural differences can 
also constitute barriers to labor mobility within the EU. 
The 2005 mid-term review found the Lisbon Agenda unsatisfactory. While the Commission introduced 
additional measures in December 2007 such as the Job Mobility Action Plan, the 2010 evaluation 
revealed that the Lisbon Agenda targets were not met (European Commission, 2010). In March 2010, 
the Commission set up a new roadmap, "Europe 2020." The main objectives of Europe 2010 were to 
increase employment rates and invest in R&D mainly by boosting private sector investment and by 
developing a new innovation indicator. Reducing drop-out rates and increasing the schooling level of 
the 30 to 34 years old as well as lifting 20 million people out of poverty were also essential goals.  
In June 2008, the EU adopted the Small Business Act (SBA) with the vision to support 
entrepreneurship, cut on red tape when starting up a business, reduce VAT rates, and exempt micro-
enterprises from accounting rules (European Commission, 2009).   
The world is now digital. Most of the jobs that exist today may not exist tomorrow and many other 
digital jobs inconceivable today will be mainstream tomorrow. Promoting lifelong learning and active 
ageing as well as mobilizing the potential of immigrants is the new pursuit of all in EU27. Producing 
the "right" human capital that withstands the unpredictable genesis of digital jobs and feeds into 
innovation is the way to have a strong knowledge-based European economy. In fact, as Europe is 6 
 
exiting the economic crisis of 2008 and as it is grappling with the Eurozone crisis and the sovereign 
debt crisis, jobs become all the more relevant. 
 
III. The EU Enlargement Scare 
Around 2003, right before the effective enlargement, Europe was confronted by looming threats of 
ageing populations and declining fertility rates; it was also grappling with economic problems, 
unemployment and integration issues of its immigrant populations. Because barriers to trading goods 
and services, and to foreign direct investments had been abolished before the EU enlargement, the most 
common pre-enlargement fears were mass migration (including illegal immigration), “welfare 
tourism”
3 and domestic labor displacement. These fears resulted in resistance by many EU15 receiving 
countries to open up their labor markets. To address concerns and fears about potential labor market 
disruptions, most OMS introduced transitional arrangements based on the ‘2+3+2’ formula. This 
transitional period of a maximum of seven years is divided into three phases in which different 
conditions apply during each phase (European Commission, 2009). All transitional arrangements for 
the EU10 should end by April 30, 2011; for the EU2 states the transition period should end on 
December 31, 2013.  
Ireland, the UK and Sweden were the first members of EU15 to open up and uphold free labor 
mobility. Naturally, they became a popular destination for the NMS migrants. Table 1 documents the 
current transitional provisions for the EU2 NMS (Bulgaria and Romania) and EU25. Germany can 
serve as a valuable paradigm of a "closed" economy within the EU27. While Germany has been 
imposing stringent restrictions on labor migrants from the EU8 countries, it was at the same time 
allowing a preferred entrance to the very high-skilled workers. Another exception referred to self-
employment. EU's Acts of ascension explicitly excluded the self-employed, who were not to be subject 
to any transitional arrangements. Keeping with the spirit of the Lisbon Agenda to promote a “more 
entrepreneurial culture and a supportive environment for small and medium size enterprises” Germany 
has been encouraging and rewarding the self-employed migrants who would open up their business in 
                                                            




4 This was the country's effort to use migration as a potential economic boon and to abide by 
the EU's laws. The self-employment policy, however, included some employment restrictions on 
foreign born business owners to keep them from hiring workers who were of the same nationality 
(Constant et al., 2010). Table 2 shows that Germany would have actually experienced a net loss of 
migration without migration from the EU8 and the enacted exceptions.  
<<<Table 1 about here>>> 
<<<Table 2 about here>>> 
The relevant question here is how afraid were the EU15 citizens from the EU27 enlargement? And, 
were their fears justified? The 2009 European Commission Eurobarometer offers an alarming actuality; 
more than one in two Europeans in the EU27 appear convinced that the EU enlargement contributed to 
job losses in their own country. Figure 1 presents the 'agrees' and 'disagrees' to the job loss inquiry by 
EU member states. Among the EU15, Greeks lead the way with 80% of them agreeing that the EU 
enlargement has contributed to job losses in Greece. Next, are the Portuguese with 72% followed by 
59% of Germans and French. At the other end of the spectrum are the Scandinavians with 58% of 
Swedes and Finns disagreeing that the EU enlargement contributed to job losses in their countries. The 
Dutch join the group with 58% as well, while 54% of Danes and Luxembourgers also disagreed that the 
EU enlargement has contributed to job losses in their countries. 
<<<Figure 1 about here>>> 
Figure 1 also presents the 'agrees' and 'disagrees' among the NMS nationals. Hungarians lead the way 
with 75% of them agreeing that the EU enlargement took jobs away from them. They are followed by 
Cypriots (73%) and Romanians and Latvians with 70%. Maltese on the other hand, do not agree (51%) 
that the EU enlargement contributed to job losses in Malta.   
Figure 2 presents the answers to the same question by sex, age, education, urbanization and occupation. 
The majority of European women (58%) agree that the EU enlargement has contributed to job losses. 
                                                            
4 For immigrants from non-EU countries, §21 of the Residence Act of 2005 effectively regulates the entry and economic 
activity of the self-employed immigrants. According to the Act, self-employed migrants who could invest at least 250,000 
Euros and create a minimum of five jobs could receive a residence permit. Until 2007, the required minimum investment for 
self-employment was one million Euros or a minimum of 10 new jobs created through this venture. 8 
 
In this thesis, they are joined by an overwhelming majority of people above 55 years of age (61%), 
people with lower education levels (64% of those with only primary schooling), people in rural areas 
(58%), and manual workers (67%).  
<<<Figure 2 about here>>> 
Scientific empirical evidence does not support these fears. The Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009) book, 
devoted to the EU post-enlargement migration, shows no evidence of displacement of native workers, 
of lowering wages, or of dependency on welfare due to the EU enlargement. The 2009 report of the 
European Commission stated that between 2004 and 2007 both the OMS and the NMS experienced an 
increase in employment. While in the OMS employment rates increased by 2.2 percentage points to 
reach 67% in 2007, in the MNS employment rates increased by 7% in five years, that is, from 55.9% in 
2004 to 59.8% in 2009. The same report concluded that there have not been any serious disturbances in 
the labor markets from the EU enlargement to 27, meaning there were no negative effects from the free 
mobility of NMS labor to the OMS. This is because the benefits from opening the labor markets are 
larger than any costs both at the aggregate and the regional level.  
 
IV. Fundamentals of Labor Migration: Benefits for All in EU? 
In general, labor migration benefits all three actors: the migrants themselves, the economies of the host 
or receiving and home or sending countries. Unfettered movement benefits the migrants themselves 
because they move to areas where their skills are demanded and rewarded. In doing so, they improve 
the allocative efficiency of the labor markets. As migrants become better off, they can remit back to 
their home countries. Remittances are not only a substantial source of income in the home countries, 
but they can also drive economic growth when recipients can invest in education and start up capital-
intensive businesses. In general, the positive impact of remittances in the home country increases with 
the income differential between home and host areas. While remittances are less important in the intra-
EU15 mobility, they may play an important positive role in the economic development of the NMS. In 
addition, while brain drain may be a concern in the sending countries (if the "brainy" people emigrate), 
their brain circulation can facilitate international trade, transfer of technologies and knowledge, and 
eliminate bottlenecks to economic development.  9 
 
However, any movement can have redistributive effects. As predicted by microeconomic theory, it all 
impinges upon the substitutability and complementarity of the factors of production. Unskilled migrant 
labor is usually considered a substitute to physical capital. It is also complementary to skilled native 
labor, thus resulting in a beneficial outcome. Unskilled workers provide a low sturdy bottom for the 
skilled workers who are freed to move upwards. At the same time, unskilled immigrant workers create 
serious competition to unskilled native workers. Usually, this implies unemployment for the unskilled 
natives. In contrast, skilled migrant labor produces a different set of results. Skilled migrant labor does 
not necessarily adversely affect skilled native workers. At this level of sophistication and specialization 
skilled migrant labor and skilled native labor may be complements in the production process helping 
each other to upward mobility. Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009) show that under certain conditions, 
skilled immigration can reduce income inequality in the host country.  
Going a step further into a "General Equilibrium" setting, Boeri and Bruecker (2009) analyze the 
migration impact under imperfect labor markets and more realistic scenaria. The authors find that labor 
migration from the EU8 into the EU15 from 2004 to 2007 led to substantial gains for the enlarged EU. 
For example, the aggregate GDP of the integrated area increased by about 0.2%, which is translated to 
24 billion Euros or 28,571 Euros per post-enlargement migrant. The authors calibrate the decline in 
wages to be 0.08-0.09% and the increase in unemployment to be 0.04-0.06% in the EU15 in the short-
run. However, in the long-run the authors find no effects of migration on wages and employment. 
Looking at distributional effects, they find that in the receiving countries high-skilled workers benefit 
from migration and less-skilled workers lose more proportionally. In the sending countries, high-skilled 
workers lose more and less-skilled workers gain.  
Lastly, both skilled and unskilled migrants have serious effects on public finance. Migration generates 
fiscal externalities in the destination and the source country. The move from a poorer to a richer 
country produces an overall fiscal net gain. For example, tax revenues from the richer nation will 
increase more than transfer payments to the poorer. However, moving from a low income redistribution 





V. Immigration and Emigration Movements in the EU27 
It is a truism that labor migrants respond to economic conditions and changes, thus they choose the 
destination countries accordingly. However, fears of immigration by the receiving nations and 
migration restrictions contribute to an uneven distribution of migrants in the labor market and in 
demographics. From the receiving country side, we observe some interesting migration patterns. Figure 
3 illustrates the distribution of EU10 migrants to EU15. They mostly emigrate to Ireland, the UK and 
Luxembourg. This is understandable because these EU15 countries were open to labor migration from 
the beginning of the enlargement. Figure 4 shows the distribution of EU2 migrants to EU15. Clearly, 
Romanians and Bulgarians choose Italy and Spain as their destination. Affinity in language and 
somewhat in culture, can explain the pattern of Figure 4. In addition, the majority of Romanian and 
Bulgarian migrants were women who worked by and large as domestics and caregivers.     
<<<Figure 3 about here>>> 
<<<Figure 4 about here>>> 
From the sending countries' perspective, emigration patterns in the EU8 and EU2 are shown in Figure 
5. Between 2000 and 2007 these countries experienced tremendous amounts of emigration. Emigration 
was the highest in Romania, where the number of emigrants skyrocketed when the country joined the 
EU27 in 2009; Bulgaria followed suit. Among the EU12, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, and Slovakia 
witnessed high numbers of emigrants who went to EU15. Consistently, over the years 2000, 2003 and 
2007, the Czech Republic and Hungary had the lowest number of emigrants going to EU15.  
<<<Figure 5 about here>>> 
The EU enlargement increased the rate of overall migration flows. However, because of distortions and 
government interventions (such as transitory arrangements), the immigrant and emigrant distributions 
among countries were uneven. Data show that the main EU15 destination country was the UK. Table 3 
provides a good documentation of the massive migration flows (in percent). Almost 60% of Poles went 
to the UK; another 17% went to Ireland. Interestingly, 55% of Slovaks also went to the UK, 21% went 
to the Czech Republic and 11% to Ireland. The majority of Latvians (52%) also went to the UK and 
33% to Ireland. Spain received the bulk of Romanians (57%) and Bulgarians (56%); next was Italy. 
Oddly enough, Germany - a country with stringent transitional arrangements - also received large 11 
 
percentages of migrants from the NMS. For example, 11% of Poles, 15% of Bulgarians, and 10% of 
Latvians went to Germany through closed doors. This Table shows that closed door policies are not 
effective tools.   
<<<Table 3 about here>>> 
Reflecting upon future mobility flows in EU, the European Commission's report (2009) stated that new 
labor waves from the NMS are doubtful for the following reasons: those who wanted to move have 
already done so, many NMS migrants want to return to their home countries, and the flows to the UK 
and Ireland appeared to have peaked in 2006. The same report criticizes the countries that imposed 
transitional arrangements. The EU enlargement experience has shown that restrictions do not stave off 
the flows of migrants. Instead, they lead to undeclared labor in the receiving countries with dangerous 
social ramifications. Finally, restrictions only delay labor market adjustments.   
  
VI. EU-Expansion's Impact on Migrants, the Receiving and Sending Countries  
1. Characteristics of the NMS Migrants and their Labor Market Outcomes  
The most distinctive labor market characteristic after the enlargement was increased labor market 
participation and higher employment rates compared to pre-enlargement. Self-employment emerged 
among EU2 migrants easing the transition and adaptation to the receiving country. However, while 
immigrants from the NMS are often well educated, the majority of them occupy low or medium skill 
jobs. Almost a quarter of EU8 immigrants have high education and the majority of them have medium 
education. EU2 immigrants were less educated than EU8 immigrants. The proportion of highly 
educated migrants from the EU8 was lower for post-enlargement arrivals, but also the share of the less-
skilled has declined. In general, EU2 immigrants were less educated than EU8 immigrants. 
Skill mismatch has been a common phenomenon in international labor markets and a large part is 
attributed to the lack of human capital transferability and language proficiency. More recently, there is 
an overall improvement in skill match. Interestingly, higher educated migrants from the EU8 countries 
went to the UK that practiced open-door migration from the beginning.  
Using Germany as an example of an EU15 country that resisted free labor mobility from EU12, Brenke 
et al. (2009) conclude the following: Migration took place even though the country had closed borders 12 
 
to the EU12. Since the EU enlargement in 2004 the composition of EU8 immigrants has changed. More 
recent immigrants from EU8 are older, less educated, work in low-paid jobs, earn lower wages and 
experience higher unemployment compared to their counterparts prior to enlargement or right after 
enlargement. It appears that recent EU immigrants in Germany compete with low-skilled non-EU 
immigrants. On the other hand, EU12 immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than native 
Germans, which is, arguably, one way to overcome labor market discrimination or assimilation 
difficulties. Among recent EU10 migrants in Germany, 40% were self-employed. Self-employment is 
thus a way to circumvent transitional arrangements! 
With the exception of Germany, EU8 immigrants in EU15 exhibit higher employment rates and lower 
unemployment and inactivity rates after enlargement compared to the populations in either the sending 
or receiving countries. In the UK, post-enlargement EU8 immigrants were more educated. Self-
employment rates were low among recent EU10 immigrants in the UK and high among EU2 
immigrants in the UK (50%). These immigrants were predominantly temporary (self-reported), males 
(but females in Germany), and of young age. 
 
2. Labor Market Outcomes for the Receiving Countries 
The main claim surrounding labor migration in conjunction with the EU enlargement has been a 
negative impact on receiving countries, including a decrease in wages and employment as well as 
higher dependability on welfare systems. However, there is no evidence to support this claim. Even 
though there may be some displacement of the natives working in low skilled jobs in some sectors, this 
has not raised aggregate unemployment, and thus, no indication of negative effects in the recipient 
countries exists. The 2009 European Commission report refers to the impact of the EU enlargement on 
public finances and the welfare state as negligible. Nonetheless, migration flows in the receiving 
countries in the short-run have created excess demand for education, housing and health care. 
A more recent study on the impact of unemployment benefits on migration in 19 European countries 
from 1993 to 2008 shows that (i) there is a small correlation between unemployment benefits and 
migration for non-EU immigrants only, and (ii) there is no relationship between unemployment benefits 
and migration flows within the EU for EU migrants (Giulietti et al., 2011). These findings do not 
support “welfare migration.”   13 
 
Following Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009), there was a general increase in migrant inflows from 
EU10 and EU2 to EU15. In 2003, migrants from EU10 and EU2 were about 0.2% of the EU15 
population. In 2007, migrants from EU10 and EU2 were about 0.5%. Still, these are very small 
numbers for a united EU labor market. They are also very small compared to other EU15 nationals 
migrating in EU15 (1.7%), or compared to non-EU nationals in EU15 (4.5%).   
Opening up the borders to EU 12 was beneficial to the rest of Europe, for it allowed rapid trade 
integration, and more positive socioeconomic conditions throughout Europe. On the other hand, studies 
show that countries that practice migration restrictions and enforce a more closed labor market miss out 
in the long run. The UK, Ireland, Spain, and Germany are contrasting examples of EU15 countries with 
different migration policies after enlargement. Below, I present their absorption rate, unemployment 
and welfare.  
The UK: Even after controlling for potential observable and unobservable confounding factors there 
was no impact on the UK unemployment rate or wages. Perhaps there was some negative effect on the 
relative wages of the least skilled. It is rather the “fear of unemployment” that has risen in response to 
immigration from the new member states and that may suppress inflationary pressures. The number of 
EU8 nationals applying for social benefits is low; child benefits constitute the largest category. 
Immigrants in the UK generally fill in gaps in labor supply. 
Ireland: Similar to the UK there were no negative effects from the EU enlargement in Ireland. There 
was no “welfare tourism” either. While some displacement of natives took place in some sectors, there 
was no rise in aggregate unemployment. Indeed, EU12 immigrants in Ireland contributed to job 
"upgrading" or upward economic mobility of natives.  
Spain: The EU enlargement and Spain's open labor markets significantly contributed to increased 
migration from the NMS. In addition, it gave many migrants from the NMS (already in the country) a 
legal status. That is, migrants from the NMS have the same job security as any native, and as legal 
workers these migrants contribute to social security. During the period 2004 to 2007, Spain had a 
booming economy and desperately need immigrants. Nonetheless, immigrants in Spain exhibit 
insufficient employment prospects. In fact, after controlling for education and other characteristics, new 14 
 
migrants from the NMS are less likely to be employed compared to their native counterparts and other 
non-EU immigrants, most of whom are Latinos (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009).   
Germany: EU enlargement fears kept Germany from opening up to the NMS. A case study about 
Germany in Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009) shows that this closed-door policy produced negative 
effects. The closed-doors transitional period that the country imposed on itself prevented Germany 
from attracting high skilled workers. At the same time, Germany attracted more and more low skilled 
migrants who end up competing with other non-EU immigrant workers for low skilled jobs. Indeed, it 
is important to note that the demographics of immigration from the EU8 countries to Germany have 
changed dramatically over the five "transitioning" years. During the transitional arrangements, some 
self-employed workers from the EU8 were allowed to settle in Germany and run a business. However, 
they were not allowed to employ workers from their home country. On January 1, 2009 the Beitrag der 
Arbeitsmigration zur Sicherung der Fachkräftebasis instituted openness to high-skilled workers. Critics 
say that the generally strong negative signals associated with Germany's policy may nullify the 
effectiveness of this new contract about skilled workers. Despite these arrangements, the number of 
migrants from the EU12 countries has clearly increased. The net flow of EU8 migrants became 2.5 
times larger than in the four-year period before enlargement. The migration flows in Germany after the 
EU enlargement consisted mostly of Poles, especially men, and migrants from the EU8, who have 
exhibited large fluctuations.  
<<<Table 4 about here>>> 
 
3. Labor Market Outcomes for the Sending Countries 
In 2003, a year before the effective enlargement, the NMS were facing jobless growth (European 
Commission, 2009). Unemployment was especially severe in Poland. To ascend to EU as equal 
partners the NMS had to undergo various structural reforms prior to enlargement. To align the old with 
the new states and reduce the gap between them when new countries join the EU, they receive large 
flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which in turn create jobs and contribute to the economic 
development of the new member countries. One of the prerequisites of ascension is also that the labor 
markets of the NMS be competitive and flexible. Eager to fulfill the economic accession criteria, the 
NMS worked hard to converge toward the Old Member States (OMS) in terms of products, labor and 15 
 
financial market regulations (European Commission, 2009). Interestingly, some observers pointed out 
that ‘reform fatigue,’ has reduced the efforts of the NMS to really reform their economies (European 
Commission, 2009). 
The NMS were undoubtedly, the biggest winners after the EU enlargement; they experienced 
improvements in employment opportunities and in overall living standards. D’Auria et al. (2008) find 
that there were big changes at the EU8 (EU2) level after enlargement. As people left their home 
countries to work in other EU15 countries, GDP declined in the sending countries. But there were gains 
in real wages, productivity and GDP per capita. In 2007, unemployment showed a serious decline for 
all NMS compared to the 2003 levels (European Commission, 2009). 
An eternal characteristic of immigrants in the receiving countries is to send remittances to their families 
and friends back in the home country. Remittances are often a significant part of the national accounts 
of the home countries that are usually less developed than the host countries. 2006 World Bank data on 
workers' remittances to the NMS show that remittances were close to 6% of GDP for Romania and 
Bulgaria, and more than 3% in Lithuania. Poland and other Baltic States also received significant 
amounts of remittances (European Commission, 2009). Overall, up until the economic crisis, the NMS 
have recorded positive and increasing remittances. 
Aggregate data for the NMS document decreasing unemployment, increasing number of vacancies, and 
employment growth, as well as increasing wages in the post-enlargement period. However, to the 
extent that the outflow of migrants consists of skilled and employed workers, this can generate 
shortages which may put a strain on social security. A World Bank (2006) study showed no incidence 
of massive “brain-drain” from the NMS, although in some sectors (such as health care) the emigration 
of highly skilled specialists was relatively large. To remain optimistic for the future, brain circulation is 
expected to go on among member states (European Commission, 2008).  
In general, emigration increased between 2000 and 2007 for all EU8 and EU2 countries. Poland and the 
Baltic States are good examples that capture the momentum of emigration upon enlargement. 
Emigration rates were the highest in Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, and Slovakia. The 
lowest were in the Czech Republic and Hungary. A special case is Poland, where as emigration 
increased it also switched from going to Germany to migrating to the UK. The number of Poles who 16 
 
stayed abroad for at least two months from early 2004 until early 2007 tripled; from around 180,000 
Poles to around 540,000. Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009) present interesting evidence that the EU 
enlargement incited the emergence of two distinct emigrant groups from the NMS: the highly-skilled 
from the "core" countries and the low-skilled from the periphery countries. 
 
VII. The Critical Juncture of the Global Economic Crisis and the EU Enlargement 
The optimistic picture of the EU enlargement up to the end of 2007 was crushed when the financial and 
economic crises of 2008 affected all EU member states. The crisis contributed greatly to the reshaping 
of European migration routes and the slowing down of labor market flows. In fact, the crisis impelled 
migrants from the NMS to return to their home countries. The NMS have been affected the most by the 
crisis in terms of unemployment and remittances. Specifically, there was deterioration in most 
aggregate variables; migration flows slowed down and many migrants started returning home. The 
reasons that prompted return migration were job loss, and of course no restrictions on movement in 
case they would want to go back after the economy would pick up. The economic crisis also intensified 
the negative feelings towards holding mismatched jobs and exacerbated the temporary intentions to 
stay abroad. Social pressure fuelled by economic difficulties in the destination countries, and the 
shrinking of social (ethnic) networks were additional push factors to return.  
The global crisis hit both the destination and sending countries; some countries were hit harder than 
others. Iceland, for example, and other Baltic States were totally vulnerable to the crisis as their 
banking sector was by international banks. Germany felt the economic crisis through its exports. Spain 
and Ireland had their own real estate bubbles and Greece was in severe debt before the crisis arrived. 
The inextricable globalization along with the Eurozone bond made it more difficult to recover. Overall, 
however, east-west migration is expected to continue after the crisis, albeit at a lower rate. The 
composition of the migrant flows may change due to the crisis. 
 
1. Economic Downturn and Flows of Immigrants: the UK 
Current data about labor migration to the UK reveal that the flow of labor migrants to the country has 
substantially dropped in the aftermath of the 2008 financial and economic downturn. Using National 17 
 
Insurance Numbers (NINo), Table 5 shows that in the pre-crisis period of 2007/2008 733,090 migrants 
went to the UK. The flow dropped to 686,110 migrants in the 2008/2009 period and dramatically 
dropped again in 2009/2010 to 572,740. In spite of a relative rebound in 2010/2011 to about 704,910, 
this level is still lower than the flow of migrants to the UK before the crisis.  
<<<Table 5 about here>>> 
Based on NINos, Figure 6 shows that since the crisis of 2008 the flow of Polish workers to the UK has 
fallen by almost 50 percentage points. In fact, the flow of migrant workers from all the NMS to the UK 
has dropped compared to its level in July-September 2008. In contrast, the flow of Romanian migrants 
to the UK has increased over the same time period. The flow of Latvians and Lithuanians has more 
than doubled, albeit following sharp ups and downs.   
<<<Figure 6 about here>>> 
 
2. Remittances  
Remittances are the link between labor migration, national accounts and development. They also hold 
tight the three actors in migration. Remittances constitute a significant part of Bulgaria’s and 
Romania’s GDP and are also important in the Baltic States. In Poland and the Baltic states remittances 
are mostly of a seasonal nature. They are largely used for household consumption and purchase of 
durable goods with a recent tendency to invest in human capital and tertiary education (World Bank, 
2006). The impact of these remittances on economic development is until now rather limited. 
While remittances are quite resilient to shocks, the crisis seems to have affected some remittance flows 
more than others in the EU. Looking at outflows of immigrants' remittances from the EU27 to EU27 
countries, Figure 7 illustrates first an increase from 2004 to 2008. Specifically, remittance flows within 
the EU27 increased from €6.1 billion in 2004, to €9.3 billion in 2007. Second, by 2008, remittances fell 
to €8.9 billion and kept falling to reach €8.3 billion in 2009. Thus the global financial and economic 
downturn of 2008 substantially affected intra-EU remittance flows. On the other hand, remittance 
outflows to outside the EU countries did not fall as much and the fall was not recorded until 2009. This 
shows a more resilient trend. The dotted line in Figure 7 represents the total outflows of workers' 18 
 
remittances from the EU27. In the EU27, total outflows in 2009 dropped to about €30.3 billion 
compared to €32.6 billion in 2008; entailing a 7% dive.  
<<<Figure 7 about here>>> 
Furthermore, Table 6 we document the major remittance corridors or inflows from some EU countries 
to other EU countries in 2007 and in 2008. Remittances from Polish workers in the UK back to Poland 
amounted to €1,061 million in 2007. They dropped to €901 million in 2008, or a -15.1% drastic 
decrease within a year. Another negative percentage change of 4.2 was recorded for remittances from 
France to Portugal. However, remittances from Spain to Romania increased by 22.5% between 2007 
and 2008. Similarly, remittances from Italy to Romania also increased by 9.4% between 2007 and 
2008. 
<<<Table 6 about here>>> 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I offer a summary and an evaluation of the achievements and impact of the 2004 and 
2007 EU enlargement to the EU27. Most findings come from the Kahanec and Zimmermann (2009) 
edited book on post-enlargement. For the idealists and romantics, a European Union of 27 
partner/countries with unfettered trade and people mobility was an exhilarating moment. For 
politicians, it was an opportunity to give nice speeches and touch base with their voters. Fear 
mongering and additional confusion from the media rendered many citizens of the "old countries" 
(EU15) apprehensive of their fellow Europeans. Eurobarometer polls show that more than one in two 
Europeans in the EU27 believed that the EU enlargement contributed to job losses in their own country.  
The European countries that have been traditionally more open to labor mobility, immediately opened 
up their labor markets to the newcomer citizens from the NMS. Others, imposed stringent temporal 
prohibitions following the "2+3+2" formula. That is, labor markets will be closed for a maximum of 7 
years after the EU enlargement for the EU12 citizens.  
In this chapter assesses and evaluates the effectiveness of the enforced policies to free mobility, while it 
identifies winner and losers. It also addresses questions related to the specificities and intricacies of the 
labor markets, to human capital and labor mobility and to pros and cons from the perspectives of the 19 
 
EU15 and EU12. It continues by adding the role of the global economic crisis in the EU enlargement 
outcomes. We seek to give answers to the following questions: How have the transitory arrangements 
affected the post-enlargement migration flows? Will many more people decide to leave the NMS for 
the old ones, or will the numbers stabilize? What will be the timing, duration and frequency of 
migrants’ sojourn abroad? Will the EU27 be able to move forward after the global crisis?  
Looking back at this historic natural experiment, we can identify winners and losers and assess the 
efficacy of the applied policies. In general, migration from the NMS to the old EU15 has increased after 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. For the EU15 countries that opened their labor markets (the UK, IR, 
ES, IT) there is a “migration diversion” effect; some evidence suggests that migration diversion 
occurred through migrants’ characteristics. “Closed” economies (AT, DE), however, also experienced 
increased immigration after the enlargement. It appears that the NMS migrants who wanted to go 
abroad and work had already gone and only registered after the enlargement.  
The EU as a whole experienced substantial positive effects in terms of GDP, GDP per capita, 
productivity and wages following both waves of expansion. It also experienced a somewhat smaller 
effect for employment in the long run. There is no evidence of negative impacts on the receiving 
countries’ labor markets in terms of wages, employment, or unemployment. Similarly, there is no 
evidence of negative impacts on the public budgets of the receiving countries or of “welfare tourism.” 
On the other hand, sending countries have experienced some disadvantages due to large outflows of 
their young and skilled workers, which might have a negative impact on economic growth and 
demographics in the long-run. However, the often temporary nature of these migration flows implies 
brain circulation and thus positive effects overall. In the short-run, there are some negative 
consequences such as limited remittances, labor shortages and vacancies in addition to skill mismatch, 
and income pressures. These externalities are often offset by decreased unemployment, remittances and 
free mobility. Thus while some risks exist, the overall outcome is mostly positive for EU members.  
With the exception of the recent EU8 immigrants to Germany, immigrants experienced greater labor 
market participation and higher employment rates than the populations in either the sending or 
receiving countries. At least until the global economic crisis hit Europe in 2008, EU12 migrants fared 
well in EU15 countries; they were among the winners. In countries with closed doors, such as 
Germany, there was a deterioration of migrants skills over time. This is at odds with the country's needs 20 
 
of highly skilled immigrant workers. Therefore, by enforcing transitional arrangements Germany has 
lost. Not only closed doors implied negative selection of immigrants for Germany, but also produced a 
delay in the adjustment of the labor markets. This was critical for Germany because this adjustment 
overlapped with the global crisis and intensified any negative impacts. A rescue plan or a loophole to 
close doors was the self-employment door.  
Labor migration is considered to be beneficial for the migrants, the sending and receiving countries. It 
improves the efficiency, productivity and wellbeing of all societies. International labor migration 
promotes democracy, international trade and human capital exchange. Labor market intervention in the 
EU comes in various forms of policies through services, measures and support. Training, employment 
incentives, direct job creation and retirement are among necessary measures. Some nations invest more 
than others. As of 2007, Belgium takes the leading role in expenditure on labor market policy with well 
over 3% of its GDP. It is unclear what future challenges may present themselves in terms of labor 
migration and what it will mean to the economies of the sending and receiving countries. There is 
neither any predictability in the composition and demographics of the migrants, nor evidence if the 
figures will ever stabilize.  
Various labor migration experts advise against any type of restrictive practices on free movement for 
the benefit of the increased efficiency of human capital allocation, stable and equal migration flows, 
and brain circulation for the sending and receiving countries. On a transnational level, free migration 
strengthens EU global competitiveness, sustainability and expands labor market opportunities. The 
overall movement of labor from the NMS to the OMS was not as large as anticipated. In many EU15 
Member States the majority of immigrants are from non-EU countries. Non-EU citizens residing in the 
EU experience negative effects, especially since the recent financial crisis that increased unemployment 
rates and worker mismatches among them. These immigrants also experienced stagnant employment 
growth and lower wages. Interestingly, while remittances from the EU27 to EU27 have decreased in 
2008, remittances to non-EU countries have exhibited more resilience. 
The global crisis of 2008 affected the EU27 as a whole and also affected some member states more 
than others. It showed how inextricable linked countries are, and how vulnerable to shocks the labor 
markets are. The optimistic view of the EU enlargement was quickly effaced by the negative effects of 
the crisis. As the EU27 and the rest of the world are recovering from the 2008 crisis, new shocks are 21 
 
uncovered such as sovereign debt that threaten the Eurozone. Europe 2020 is determined to achieve a 
high level of employment, produce a unique human capital that will match the digital age, and invest in 
innovation.    
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Table 1: Current Transitional Arrangements in the EU 
Member State  Workers from Bulgaria and Romania/EU25 
EU25 
Belgium  Restrictions with simplifications
Czech Republic  Free access – national law (1 January 2007)
Denmark  Free access (1 May 2009)
Germany  Restrictions with simplifications*
Estonia  Free access (1 January 2007)
Ireland  Restrictions
Greece  Free access (1 January 2009)
Spain  Free access (1 January 2009)
Restrictions for workers from Romania (22 July 2011- safeguard clause)
France  Restrictions with simplifications
Italy  Restrictions with simplifications
Cyprus  Free access (1 January 2007)
Latvia  Free access (1 January 2007)
Lithuania  Free access (1 January 2007)
Luxembourg  Restrictions with simplifications
Hungary  Free access (1 January 2009)
Malta  Restrictions
Netherlands  Restrictions with simplifications
Austria  Restrictions with simplifications*
Poland  Free access (1 January 2007)
Portugal  Free access (1 January 2009)
Slovenia  Free access (1 January 2007)
Slovakia  Free access (1 January 2007)
Finland  Free access (1 January 2007)
Sweden  Free access (1 January 2007)
United Kingdom  Restrictions
EU2 
Bulgaria  No reciprocal measures
Romania  No reciprocal measures
Note: * Restrictions also on the posting of workers in certain sectors 






Citizenship 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Poland 70,431 75,012 77,405 84,693 119,551 141,314 145,761
Hungary 15,514 16,455 15,982 13,790 16,834 18,026 18,111
Slovakia 10,413 10,985 10,889 10,006 11,053 11,395 10,933
Czech. Rep. 10,392 10,207 9,601 7,873 8,275 7,762 7,125
Slovenia 1,770 2,504 2,197 1,975 2,260 1,397 1,080
Estonia . . . 738 667 635 529
Latvia . . . 1,642 2,085 2,248 1,857
Lithuania . . . 2,775 4,150 4,859 4,477
EU8 108,520 115,163 116,074 123,492 164,875 187,636 189,873
Romania 22,521 18,547 22,376 22,329 22,203 22,052 22,532
Bulgaria 10,008 12,516 12,371 12,613 10,891 8,492 7,260
Turkey 39,575 44,189 47,616 41,908 36,275 30,002 26,059
Russia 25,996 28,208 29,072 25,671 23,168 19,072 14,274
Ukraine 14,349 16,053 16,260 14,005 12,171 9,091 6,520
Other countries 153,116 175,217 174,215 150,830 136,713 125,127 121,849
Germany 132,773 134,616 128,238 118,019 131,752 92,953 77,082
EU15 115,359 105,896 97,127 86,745 81,643 78,175 78,535
Total 554,073 587,168 576,224 526,206 533,310 517,783 579,048
Poland 11,841 12,836 11,461 13,003 26,600 44,951 40,569
Hungary 1,500 2,010 685 -770 793 2,716 3,426
Slovakia 2,000 1,548 1,462 806 1,240 2,522 1,696
Czech. Rep. 2,070 2,154 1,113 58 433 1,868 1,034
Slovenia -32 255 26 -5,867 76 -37 1
Estonia . . . 268 -38 203 60
Latvia . . . 292 510 891 379
Lithuania . . . 831 1,888 2,465 1,437
EU8 17,379 18,803 14,747 8,621 31,502 55,579 48,602
Romania 6,900 1,319 5,840 3,634 2,896 2,334 1,627
Bulgaria 3,511 4,819 4,027 2,860 1,137 2,746 226
Turkey 7,992 14,871 17,526 11,650 5,666 2,766 881
Russia 15,816 17,770 17,202 14,094 11,360 8,366 4,078
Ukraine 10,128 10,782 9,988 8,136 6,460 3,999 1,782
Other countries 53,820 76,198 71,707 43,516 20,558 21,075 16,269
Germany 47,930 49,330 37,330 19,484 13,524 -17,796 -41,009
EU15 5,868 2,345 -8,486 -10,019 -25,507 -4,401 -2,524
Total 83,687 155,030 133,979 89,013 53,789 91,199 31,721
Notes: Authors' calculation using Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office) - Population Register.
Outflow numbers are inflow minus net migration numbers. "Other countries" include remaining countries,
stateless individuals and individuals with unknown nationality. 
Table 2: Total Annual Inflow and Net Migration Numbers by Citizenship in Germany
A. Total Annual Inflows
B. Total Annual Net Migration
 




EU8-Recent imm. -0.277 (0.003) -0.245 (0.005) -0.745 (0.037) -0.231 (0.008) 0.157 (0.005)
EU8-Earlier imm. -0.210 (0.001) -0.166 (0.001) -1.199 (0.014) -0.127 (0.007) -0.009 (0.001)
Non-EU Earlier imm. -0.126 (0.007) -0.104 (0.006) -0.741 (0.041) -0.125 (0.002) -0.021 (0.001)
Non-EU Recent imm. -0.371 (0.003) -0.256 (0.005) -2.595 (0.076) -0.442 (0.012) -0.037 (0.002)
EU15-Earlier imm. -0.031 (0.004) -0.045 (0.002) 0.794 (0.033) -0.023 (0.001) 0.025 (0.001)
EU15-Recent imm. 0.058 (0.009) 0.114 (0.004) -1.627 (0.138) -0.220 (0.008) -0.010 (0.002)
Native-Other -0.099 (0.003) -0.085 (0.003) -0.630 (0.024) -0.061 (0.003) -0.021 (0.000)
Gender -0.469 (0.009) -0.179 (0.007) -8.597 (0.050) -0.129 (0.006) -0.041 (0.000)
Age 0.263 (0.014) 0.144 (0.024) 2.019 (0.373) 0.003 (0.024) 0.059 (0.002)
Years of Education  0.081 (0.006) 0.066 (0.005) 0.492 (0.032) 0.029 (0.002) 0.009 (0.000)
Notes: Number of observations are 240,413 for first three regression and 421,840 for last two regressions. Standard errors 
clustered by state are shown in parantheses. Each regression also controls for polynomial of age up to degree four, and 16 state 
indicators. "EU8-Recent imm.", "EU15-Recent imm.", " Non-EU Recent imm." show immigrants who arrived after 2004 from 
EU8 countries, from EU15 countries, and outside the EU respectively.  "EU8-Earlier imm.", "EU15-Earlier imm.", " Non-EU 
Earlier imm." shows immigrants who arrived before 2004 from EU8 countries, from EU15 countries, and outside the EU, 
respectively.  "Native-Other" indicates German citizens who obtained German nationality after birth.  The omitted group is 
German natives in all regressions.
Table 4: Labor Market Outcomes by Citizenship for all Immigrant Groups by Arrival Status.
Logincome Loghourly-wage Work Hours Employment Self Employment
 
  
Table 3: Preferred Destination Countries of Recent Intra-EU Movers (Age Group 15-64) 
Citizenship of EU-nationals residing 
for four years or less in another EU 
Member State… 
… by main EU destination country (percentage of overall 
number of working age nationals residing four years and less in 
another EU Member State) 
Poland  59% to the UK  17% to IE  11% to DE 
Romania  57% to ES  26% to IT  2% to the UK 
Bulgaria  56% to ES  15% to DE  16% to BE 
Slovakia  55% to the UK  21% to the CZ  11% to IE 
Latvia  52% to the UK  33% to IE  10% to DE 
Other EU Citizens  38% to the UK  17% to DE  9% to FR 
All recent intra EU-movers  32% to the UK  18% to ES  10% to IE 
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, Annual Data 2007, European Commission (2009) 
Source: Brenke et al. (2009), Table 4. 25 
 
Table 5: NINo
* registrations to adult overseas nationals entering the UK, by Year of 
Registration and world area, in Thousands 
   
   2007/08 2008/09 2009/10  2010/11
All                     733.09 686.11 572.74  704.91
          
Europe - EU excluding Accession Countries      107.47 120.14 91.36  134.96
Europe - EU Accession Countries       332.44 257.04 182.77  224.76
Europe - non-EU          17.21 16.10 12.90  16.64
Africa                 59.63 63.31 48.14  59.72
Asia and Middle East    149.87 163.04 190.57  213.53
The Americas            32.64 36.45 28.15  32.78
Australasia and Oceania                 33.35 29.53 18.34  21.59
Others and Unknown                   0.49 0.50 0.52  0.92
Note: 
* NINo stands for National Insurance Number 
Source: UK Department for Work and Pensions, August 2011; Own Presentation 
 
 
Table 6: Major Remittance Corridors – Inflows, € million
*
Remittance Corridors 2007 2008 % Change 2007-2008
Romania    Italy  2,013 2,202 9.4 
Romania    Spain  1,289 1,579 22.5 
Spain    United Kingdom c c  
Portugal    France 1,026 983 -4.2 
Poland    United Kingdom 1,061 901 -15.1 
Spain    Switzerland c c  
Spain    United States c c  
Greece    United States 515 558 8.4 
Portugal    Switzerland 545 554 1.7 
Greece    Germany   545  
Note: 
* In order of officially recorded flows in 2008; (c) = confidential 
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Figure 1: EU Enlargement Has Contributed to Job Losses in our Country, by Country
Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer (2009); Own Presentation27 
 































































Source: Kahanec et al. (2009), Figure 2. 
Source: Kahanec et al. (2009), Figure 2 (cont’d). 28 
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Figure 7: Total Outflows of Workers' Remittances from EU27 Member States, € billion
Source: EurostatNewsrelease 191/2010; Own Presentation 